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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of credit risk in the case of Malaysia Islamic banks. Using a yearly 
bank level data from 1995 to 2013, this paper utilizes the fixed effect model to provide empirical evidences on Islamic banks 
credit risk in Malaysia. The empirical results demonstrate that a few bank-specific variables do significantly influence credit risk 
of Malaysia Islamic banks. The findings show that financing quality and capital ratio demonstrate consistent results regardless of 
specification and estimation models. The inclusion of ownership status also suggests that there is a significant difference between 
the local and foreign ownership Islamic banks in this regard. The finding added important evidence to the existing literature on 
credit risk specifically Islamic banks credit risk. 
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1. Introduction 
The Islamic banking and finance (IBF) industry has witnessed several important events during the last decade. Since 
their inception in 1975, IBs have now become a global phenomenon, including the United Kingdom (UK), China (Hong 
Kong), Australia, Singapore and much of Europe. In certain countries like Malaysia and Bahrain, the Islamic banking 




* Corresponding author. Tel.: +607-9352000. 
E-mail address: fnmisman@gmail.com 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of Universiti Teknologi MARA Johor
76   Faridah Najuna Misman et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  31 ( 2015 )  75 – 82 
industry is proven by its total assets value which grew from US$1.8 trillion estimated at the end of 2013 and is 
expected to be more than US$2.0 trillion by the end of 2014 (see IFSB, 2014). During the last ten years the IB industry 
has witnessed changes in economic conditions and the onset of a financial crisis.  It is reported that IBs still remain 
strong and continue to grow globally.  
Early studies on credit risk determinants had primarily focused on conventional banking credit risk management 
particularly in developed countries (Berger & DeYoung, 1997; Berger & Udell, 1990, 1994).  A few other relevant 
studies have attempted to address IBs’ risk management. For example, Febianto (2012) conducted a library-based 
research analysis, and Abedifar, Molyneux, and Tarazi (2012) did an empirical analysis on 24 Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) countries. This paper aims to examine the key determinants of credit risk of Islamic banks in 
Malaysia by introducing Islamic financing types (IFT) and ownership status (Status) variables. Malaysia has been 
chosen as the sample country because of its position in the global Islamic banking industry. The Malaysian IBs are 
ranked third in the global IB industry following Iran and Saudi Arabia. Malaysia established its first Islamic banks in 
1983. Since then, the number of IB products and services has expanded with the implementation of Interest-free 
Banking Scheme (IFBS) in 1993. The IFBS allowed conventional banks (CBs) to offer Shari`ah-approved products and 
services through Islamic windows. The IB industry in Malaysia received strong support from the government, and as at 
the end of 2014 there were 16 fully-fledged IBs and 4 international IBs operating in the country.  
2. Literature review 
Credit risk management studies have attracted the attention of many parties, particularly in developed countries. 
Investigating the factors that drive the credit risk in the banking sector is not only important to the bank’s management 
but also to regulatory authorities. Prior studies have measured the credit risk by using the ratio of non-performing loans 
(NPL). In banking studies, the loan is classified as NPL when the payment of interest and principal are overdue by 90 
days or more.  Higher NPL causes the banks to experience lower profit margins and if the problem becomes more 
serious, it can lead to a crisis. Potential influences on the NPL include the types of borrower, bank management and 
adverse changes in the economic situation. The importance of efficient credit risk management invites many parties 
especially researchers, regulators and banks’ management to investigate the determinants of credit risk in banking. This 
will help them to understand and propose a comprehensive credit risk management framework.  
Most studies suggest that there are two strands of literature on the factors that drive credit risk. The most popular 
strand suggests that credit risk is driven by several bank specific variables (BSV) and the second strand argues that 
macroeconomic factors greatly influence the credit risk of banks. A survey of the literature informs us that previous 
studies normally examined the determinants of credit risk either using BSV or macroeconomic factors as explanatory 
variables.  However, a few studies used both BSV and macroeconomics variables to explain the NPL of banks. The 
examples include Louzis, Vouldis, and Metaxas (2012) who examine the determinants of credit risk in Greece’s 
banking sector by using macroeconomic and BSV as explanatory variables.  They used the NPL of different loan 
categories as the dependent variables and find that NPL of Greek banks are mainly explained by macroeconomic 
variables such as unemployment, gross domestic product (GDP) and interest rates. 
Most empirical studies that investigate the effect of the BSV on NPL, uses loan growth, loan quality, management 
quality, size, loan concentrations, and capital as the variables. Demirguc-Kunt (1989) has reviewed empirical literature 
on deposit-institution failures. He compared and summarized the models and variables for banking failure studies. 
Demirguc-Kunt concludes that capital adequacy, assets quality, management competence and earnings are among the 
significant explanatory variables for bank failure. Berger and DeYoung (1997) focus on the BSV as an indicator for 
problem loans and efficiency of the banks. Using a US commercial banks dataset for the period 1985 to 1994, they 
examined the inter-temporal relationship between problem loans and cost efficiency. They developed four hypotheses 
related to: i) bad management (low cost efficiency signal for poor management); ii) bad luck referring to external 
events; iii) moral hazard; and iv) skimming issue. They find evidence that cost efficiency and capital are negatively 
associated with problem loans. Angbazo (1997) uses US Bank Call Report Data for 1989 to 1993 to examine the 
relationship between net interest margins (NIM) and interest rates risk, default risk and off-balance sheet activities. The 
author claims that there is a significant relationship between size, NIM and default risk. More recent studies focusing on 
the BSV as the main determinant of credit risk include Konishi and Yasuda (2004); Godlewski (2005); and Jiménez, 
Lopez, and Saurina (2007).  
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2.1. Islamic banks and credit risk 
Interest in risk management in IB has grown. An increasing number of studies on risk management of IBs focus on 
the processes of risk management, Shari`ah issues and related risks faced by IBs. Only a few studies address the issue 
of risk determinants, particularly credit risk. Although the number of empirical studies on IBs’ credit risk is small, a few 
attempted to address the issues related to this specific kind of risk (Al-Tamimi & Al-Mazrooei, 2007; Hassan, 2009; 
Makiyan, 2008; Wilson, 2007). Researchers have addressed various risk management issues including credit risk; 
however, all these studies do not empirically identify the determinants of IBs’ credit risk. Several empirical analyses 
examine their risk and most of them used a single country analysis and BSV as the explanatory variable. For example, 
How et al. (2005) studied  IBs risk using 23 Malaysian commercial banks’ data for 1988 to 1996. The authors found 
that banks offering Islamic financing (IF) have significantly less credit risk than banks that do not. They also suggest 
that size does significantly influence the credit risk of both IBs and CBs.  More recently, Aisyah Abdul.  Rahman, 
Mansor, and Meera (2009) examined the impact of lending structures and specific BSV on the insolvency risk of CBs 
an IBs in Malaysia from 1994 to 2006. Lending structures, provisions for loss and assets size affect Malaysian CBs and 
IBs in different ways. This conclusion implies that the regulatory bodies should introduce different capital guidelines 
for both banking systems, since their operations and products are substantially different.   
The other study by Ahmad and Ahmad (2004) examine the key factors influencing the credit risk of Malaysian IBs. 
They used a dataset comprising one fully-fledged Islamic bank, six Islamic windows and six CBs for the period 1996 to 
2002. This study reports that management efficiency, risk-weighted assets and size have a significant influence on 
Malaysian IBs’ (MIBs) credit risk. They also discover there are similarities and differences between credit risk 
determinants for CBs and IBs. The authors note that IBs should have a comprehensive risk management framework and 
adequate disclosure of information on concentrations of financing assets and risks, which occurs in CBs’ banking 
reports. Aisyah Abdul. Rahman and Shahimi (2010) analyse the impact of financing structure and BSV on credit risk 
using panel data analysis for Malaysian IBs from 1994 to 2008. They also incorporated macroeconomic variables into 
their framework. The results reveal that type of financing reacts differently to credit risk when the model was controlled 
for macroeconomic variables. The credit supply and spread of long-term interest rate and money market rate have a 
positive influence on credit risk. These indicate that the IBs should be able to manage credit supply by not excessively 
lending to risky sectors, which will only increase the credit risk exposures. 
3. Data and methodology 
The data is collected from financial statements and annual reports of 17 Malaysian IBs; these documents are located 
on the BankScope database and each bank’s website.  Eighty-nine (89) observations were collected from these 17 
MIBs. The data on IFT offered by MIBs were retrieved from each bank’s hard copy annual reports. However, some 
banks do not provide details about the types of financing they offer to clients, especially during the time they first 
started. For this reason, the sample period is limited to only 14 years (from 2000 to 2013) with the total number of 
observations reduced to 82 for the second part of the analysis when assessing the impact of Islamic financing structure 
on credit risk.  
This paper employs the panel data technique to identify the determinants of credit risk of MIBs. Panel data is a 
technique that pools the sample observations in the cross-section over a certain period of time. In panel data, the 
observations are indexed through N x T dimension. N is the number of firms (panels) and T is the dimension of a time 
series, such as yearly, monthly or daily.  t=1, 2,….., T of each i=1, 2,…., N cross-section observations in the sample. 
The panel data model fits this study because it can analyse changes at the bank level which cannot be done in either 
cross-section or time series models. Furthermore, using the panel data can also reduce the multicollinearity problem and 
provide a larger degree of freedom. These two can be achieved because the panel data technique increases the number 
of data points (Baltagi, 2005). The panel data model is expressed as: 
 
yit = β0 + βit Xit + uit   i=1,…..N; t=1,…..T 
(1) 
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Where in (1) above, yit, uit are N x 1 vectors, X is N x k matrix, β is k x 1 vector and  β0 is an unknown constant 






CRit = β0 + βit Xit + αi +  νit              
   For i = 1,…..17 = N, t = 1,…..14 = T, k = 1,…..7 = BSV’s. 
 (2) 
Where; 
i. Xit  is a vector of explanatory variables measured at time t,  
ii. αi  is unobserved in all periods but constant over time i,   
iii. νit is a time-varying idiosyncratic error, 
In equation 2, CRit is the dependent variable which represents credit risk of the ith Islamic bank (i=1,2,…..17) in tth 
year (with t = 1, 2, …14), it is a function of a vector of independent variables which is indexed by k (k = 1,2,…..7) 
independent variables. These seven independent variables are: i) financing expansion (Fin Exp); ii) financing quality 
(FLP); iii) capital buffer (Cap Buffer); iv) capital ratio (CAPR); v) NIM; vi) management efficiency (MGT); and vii) 
log of total assets (SIZE). β0 is the intercept. BPLM test, F-test for fixed effects and Hausman test is used to choose the 
appropriate model to be applied in this paper.   
4. Finding and analysis 
Table 1 summarizes the value of correlations for all variables used. The test identifies a few variables that have a 
relatively high correlation with the correlation values above 0.5. The variables are CAPR and capital buffer (0.795), 
SIZE and capital buffer (-0.575) and SIZE and CAPR (-0.583). To further investigate this issue, a VIF post-
estimation test is applied. The results of this VIF test suggest that there is no multicollinearity problem occurs in the 
variables. 
Table 1: Pairwise Correlation Matrix of Variables 
  CR Fin. Exp FLP 
Cap 
Buffer 
CAPR NIM MGT SIZE EBF SBF STATUS 
CR 1.000           
Fin. Exp -0.269*** 1.000          
FLP 0.488*** 0.092 1.000         
Cap. 
Buffer -0.097 





-0.139 0.796*** 1.000       
NIM -0.043 0.122 0.135 -0.045 0.068 1.000      
MGT 
0.214** 
0.450*** 0.137 -0.254*** -0.487*** 
-
0.344*** 
1.000     
SIZE 0.170 0.416*** 0.083 -0.576*** -0.584*** 0.075 0.351*** 1.000    
EBF 0.542*** 0.059 0.327*** -0.124 -0.211** 0.060 0.295*** 0.475*** 1.000   
SBF 0.403*** -0.134 0.226** 0.122 0.106 0.164 0.018 -0.042 0.454*** 1.000  
STATUS 
-0.331*** 





-0.116 0.261** 1.000 
Note: Fin. Expansion, the ratio of total financing to total assets; FLP, the ratio of loan loss provision to total assets; Cap Buffer, the ratio of total 
equity to total assets; CAPR, the ratio of TIER 1 & TIER 2 to total assets; NIM, net interest margin; MGT, the ratio of total earning assets to total 
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assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. EBF is a dummy variable, 1 for equity-based financing, 0 otherwise; SBF is a dummy 
variable, 1 for supporting-based financing, 0 otherwise; STATUS is a dummy variable, 1 for foreign incorporated IBs, 0 otherwise. ***, ** and * 
denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
4.1. Estimated results 
The ratio of NPF to total financing (CR) is regressed against seven BSV, two dummies for IFT and a dummy for 
STATUS. The analysis is conducted using unbalanced panel data from 1995 to 2013. The total number of 
observations is 89 for the model without IFT variables and 82 for the model including IFT variables. White’s (1980) 
cross-section is used to adjust the standard errors for potential occurrence of heteroskedasticity. 
Table 2: Estimation results 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Credit risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff S.E Coeff S.E Coeff S.E Coeff S.E 
C 30.441* 16.065 65.057 48.313 -11.125 12.980 20.833 19.997 
Fin. Exp -0.239** 0.103 -0.009 0.172 -0.031 0.218 0.027 0.223 
Fin.Exp2 0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
FLP 1.353*** 0.210 0.978 0.572 2.100*** 0.270 1.447*** 0.394 
Cap. Buffer 0.361* 0.179 0.287 0.450 0.562*** 0.144 0.245 0.227 
CAPR -0.137*** 0.034 -0.089*** 0.027 -0.126** 0.062 -0.095* 0.053 
NIM 0.431* 0.222 0.290 0.187 0.078 0.424 -0.229 0.295 
MGT -0.040 0.023 -0.082* 0.045 0.034 0.036 -0.059 0.046 
SIZE -1.117 1.021 -3.725 3.097 1.062 0.681 -0.798 1.172 
EBF   -0.756 0.841   3.257 2.103 
SBF   -0.114 0.475   2.264 1.926 
STATUS     -3.903*** 0.946 -5.176** 2.337 
         
R-squared 0.312  0.420  0.504  0.576  
No. of observations 89  82  89  82  
Dummy variables No  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm fixed effects Yes   Yes   No   No   
Notes: i) Columns (1) and (2) used panel fixed effects regression, column (3) used OLS regression, and column (4) used random effects GLS 
regression. All column results the Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and covariance using White’s cross-sections. ***, ** 
and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The estimations are conducted on unbalanced panel data of 89 and 82 
observations from 1995-2011 for 17 IBs.  The observations are less due to the availability of data for financing types offered by banks.        
ii) Dependent variable is the ratio of non-performance financing to total financing. The independent variables are Fin. Exp, the ratio of total 
financing to total assets; FLP, the ratio of loan loss provision to total assets; Cap Buffer, the ratio of total equity to total assets; CAPR, the 
ratio of TIER 1 & TIER 2 to total assets; NIM, net interest margin; MGT, the ratio of total earning assets to total assets; SIZE, the natural 
logarithm of total assets; EBF is 1 for equity-based financing, 0 otherwise; SBF is 1 for supporting-based financing, 0 otherwise. STATUS is 
1 for foreign IBs, 0 otherwise 
 
Table 2 presents the regression results. Column 1 presents the results for base model, whereas credit risk is 
regressed against seven BSV. Different control variables are added to the model in columns 2 to 4. Fixed effects 
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(FE) specification is used in the regression in columns 1 and 2 only. In columns 3 and 4 a dummy for STATUS is 
included in the model, STATUS dummy is time invariant variable. Therefore, fixed effects model cannot be applied 
in these two columns.  The BPLM test suggests pooled OLS regression is the better choice for the column 3 model 
and random effects generalised least square (RE-GLS) to be applied in column 4.  
The explanatory power of results in column 1 is about 31.2% with five BSV having significant effects on credit 
risk at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level. Financing expansion shows a negative coefficient with credit risk in 
both fixed effects and OLS specification but not in RE-GLS. However, it only appears to have a significant effect 
for base model in column 1. This negative significant result is consistent with Aisyah Abdul. Rahman and Shahimi 
(2010). The analysis assumes that financing expansion to have a non-linear relationship with credit risk. The 
quadratic specification is used in all columns. For the FE model the relationship between financing expansion and 
credit risk is U-shaped rather than an inverted U-shape for the RE-GLS model.  
Financing quality reports have positive significant relationships with credit risk for FE and RE-GLS specification 
in columns 1, 2 and 3, respectively. This variable is highly significant in determining the credit risk as all the 
coefficients are significant at 1% level. These results are as expected because more provisioning indicates that a 
bank may have a problem with financing quality. The downgrade in financing quality will potentially increase the 
risk of financing being defaulted. The coefficient declines in the fixed-effects specification model.  It is worth 
mentioning that the FE model explores the differences between each individual bank. This suggests each bank in the 
sample exhibits different characteristics over time; for example, the risk management policy and its influence on the 
quality of the financing portfolio.  
Bank capital is an important variable used by the bank to manage credit risk level. BCBS introduced the Capital 
Adequacy Framework to promote soundness and stability in the financial system by controlling the banks from 
taking on excessively risky activities (Basel, 1999). The BNM developed a capital adequacy framework for the 
Islamic banks (CAFIB) to safeguard IBs’ risk management practices. Maintaining higher capital adequacy ratio 
helps IBs to improve due to diligence and discipline in managing risk exposures. The coefficients for CAR are 
negative and statistically significant regardless of specification and estimation methods. This demonstrates that more 
regulatory capital held by the IBs will help them to reduce their exposure to credit risk. It implies that higher CAR 
and prudent capital management policy can reduce the level of problem financing in MIBs.  
The other proxy for the bank capital in this study is the ratio of total equity to total assets, Cap Buffer. Past 
studies report mixed results regarding the relationship of capital buffer and credit risk. For example, Godlewski 
(2005) finds a positive significant relationship between equity and risk, while Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) report 
negative relationships between capital buffer and credit risk. This analysis finds capital buffer does have a positive 
coefficient and is statistically significant for columns 1 and 2 when the models were not controlled by the IFT 
dummy. A positive sign explains that IBs with more equity capital tend to have higher credit risk than banks with 
less equity. This implies that banks with higher equity capital tend to engage in more risky financing activities 
because they believe they have enough capital to buffer any potential losses.  
NIM is only significant in the base model using the FE estimation method. When the estimation model includes 
the IFT and STATUS dummy, NIM is insignificant regardless of the estimation models. The MGT only shows 
negative significant results in the column 2 estimation, whereas the model was controlled for IFT. The earning 
assets of IBs consist of differently structured IF contracts. Therefore, IBs should carefully decide the proportion of 
each type of financing contract because different contracts expose IBs to different levels of risk. IBs’ inability to 
manage this MGT will lead to a high credit risk level. With regard to the relationships between size and credit risk, 
we failed to find any significant relationships between these two variables in all estimations.  
The observation of IFT dummies is important when examining whether different types of IFT have varied 
impacts on credit risk of IBs in Malaysia. We introduced two IFT dummies: EBF and SBF in columns 2 and 4. The 
EBF dummy takes a value of one for IBs that offers financing based on PLS contracts, while the SBF dummy takes 
value of one if the IBs offer financing using other than PLS and trading contracts. Surprisingly, we find that both 
IFT dummies do not show any significant effects on credit risk level of IBs. This implies that MIBs have efficient 
risk management frameworks in place and current policies that help IBs to mitigate risk from both types of financing 
structures. 
This study also examines the impact of ownership status on credit risk of MIBs. Here we focus on the effect of 
local and foreign ownership rather than other types of ownership; for example government ownership, institutional 
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ownership or individual ownership. STATUS dummy takes a value of one for foreign owned banks and zero for 
locally owned banks. The outcome shows a negative coefficient for the ownership dummy with OLS and RE-GLS 
methods, implying that foreign IBs faced lower credit risk compared to local ones. It means that there is a 
statistically significant difference between foreign and locally owned IBs in relation to credit risk management. This 
is expected as foreign IBs contend have more expertise in terms of human capital. Foreign IBs may bring foreign 
managers into their teams who have the required skills and technological expertise. Lensink and Hermes (2004) 
discuss this matter, and according to them international expertise will transfer the knowledge and skills to the local 
personnel and indirectly improve a bank’s risk management system.  
5. Conclusion 
The results suggest that a few BSV do significantly influence credit risk of MIBs. We find financing quality and 
CAR demonstrate consistent results regardless of specification and estimation models. The results suggest that any 
deterioration in financing quality forces the banks to allocate higher loss provisions, and consequently increase the 
implied credit risk level. There is also evidence that CAPR is negative and statistically significant in determining the 
credit risk level of IBs in Malaysia. Other explanatory variables demonstrate different effects across the estimation 
models. For example, capital buffer only appears to have a positive significant effect on credit risk in the OLS and 
FE estimation models. NIM only indicates significant results in the base model of the FE specification. When the 
IFT and ownership variables are included in the estimations, NIM is no longer significant. The inclusion of 
STATUS dummy suggests that foreign IBs are more likely to carry lower credit risk compared to local IBs, 
suggesting that there is a difference between the local and foreign ownership banks in this regard. The synergy 
between international and local experts in foreign IBs helps them to manage credit risk better. 
There are several limitations of this study that should be focus to work on in future studies. This study only uses 
Islamic banks as a sample. For future study, a comparison between Islamic banks and conventional banks will also 
add value to the study. Future study may also include other internal variables and macroeconomics variables in 
examining the causes for credit risk in Islamic banks. By doing so, it will cover both micro and macroeconomics 
variables and the estimation are expected to give more insight on the credit risk management of Islamic banks.  
Appendix A. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Unit Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max 
CR 92 % 5.715 3.910 5.537 0.070 22.113 
Fin. Exp 104 % 51.206 54.480 16.951 0.826 79.642 
FLP 103 % 0.870 0.529 1.259 -0.264 9.842 
Cap. Buffer 104 % 9.906 7.737 8.716 -1.699 77.181 
CAPR 104 % 21.494 14.425 28.218 -2.470 211.920 
NIM 97 % 3.327 3.170 1.543 0.113 7.422 
MGT 104 % 74.900 75.776 16.386 17.840 99.342 
SIZE 104 US$ 3,748,975 2,683,844 3,314,923 96,466 21,800,000 
     Notes: i). The observations range from 92 to 104 on fully-fledged IBs (unbalanced data of 17 banks for period 1995 to 2011). Sample data are        
     not the same for all years due to banks being established in different years. The table presents the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum     
     and maximum value of each variable. All the data are in ratio value except for SIZE which is thousand US$.  
     ii). CR is the ratio of non-performance financing to total financing; Fin. Exp, the ratio of total financing to total assets; FLP, the ratio of loan   
     loss provision to total assets; Cap Buffer, the ratio of total equity to total assets; CAPR, the ratio of TIER 1 & TIER 2 to total assets; NIM, net  
     interest margin; MGT, the ratio of total earning assets to total assets; SIZE is total assets value.   
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